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Abstract. In this article I will criticize the so called Frankfurt-style
cases. These cases have been built with the purpose of denying that
in order to hold a person responsible, it’s necessary this person could
have done otherwise, namely there were alternative possibilities. I
present here two arguments according towhich Frankfurt’s cases did
not succeed in this attempt. In the first argument I will focus, from
and ethical and a logical point of view, on the Principle of Alterna-
tive Possibilities, and Iwill show that the Frankfurt-style cases are not
truly able to falsify it. The second argument is semantical and con-
cerns the formulation of Frankfurt example.
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1 Introduction to the problem
It seems obvious that in order to hold a person responsible for something, we
need to assume that she could have done otherwise. In other words we natu-
rally take for granted the so called Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): a
person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done
otherwise (see Frankfurt (1969, p. 829)). This principle was accepted not only
by the common sense, but also from the majority of philosophers, at least until
Frankfurt challenged it in his very influential “Alternative possibilities andMoral
Responsibility”. That paper, according to many, has proved that PAP is false. In
this paper I would like to criticize Frankfurt’s argument by showing, first of all,
that PAPmust be clarified and, thereafter, that there are alternative possibilities
in Frankfurt-style cases.
I will build here a Frankfurt-style case that should undermine PAP. In the lit-
erature there have been many complications and reformulations of Frankfurt’s
original case in order to defend Frankfurt-style cases from some criticisms (see
Mele and Robb (1998, p. 101) and see Fischer (2011, p. 249)). I believe however
that the following example can be representative of the debate in general, and
can work for the purpose of this paper. Suppose Mr. Black knows that Jones is
a political dissenter and he desires an armed revolution. Black knows that to-
morrowmorning Jones will show up in front of the parliament with a gun in his
coat in order to kill the Prime Minister1. Black, however, is aware that Jones is
kind of a coward man, and it would not be the first time that he show up armed
in front of the parliament without doing anything. This time Black, who wants
the death of the PrimeMinister, has placed in Jones’ brain, without Jones know-
ing, a sophisticated mechanism, able to screen off Jones’ thought, and able to
force him to kill the Prime Minister if Black pushes a certain button. Black does
not want to interfere unnecessarily: he will push the button only if he sees that
Jones shows the intention (and Black can check this “mental process” thanks to
the mechanism) to not kill the Prime Minister. However that morning Jones is
particularly resolute to kill the Prime Minister and, on his own, he shoots her
with the gun. If, as Frankfurt persuasively suggests, Jones is morally responsible
it seems that PAP is false, since he cannot do otherwise. In any case, in fact, he
would have killed the PrimeMinister.
Most philosophers have found Frankfurt-style cases compelling (Ginet 1996,
p. 404), and this kind of argument has been used by the supporters of compati-
bilism about free will. Although many philosophers have taken for granted that
Frankfurt has shown PAP to be false, there are some dissenters (Widerker 1995,
p. 247 and seeO’Connor 2005). There are differentways to attack Frankfurt-style
1In the example at stake the agent is blameworthy, because I assume that the action is morally
wrong. In thispaper Iwill not considerwhetherFrankfurt-style cases canworkboth forblameworthy
and praiseworthy actions (Nelkin 2011, p. 1), and I will assume a symmetry between these two.
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cases; in this paper I will refer to some elements of Widerker’s criticism, one of
the most influential voices conflicting with Frankfurt.
2 Alternative possibilities in Frankfurt-style cases
I believe that in order to criticize Frankfurt-style cases we should look carefully
at PAP, trying to understand what such a principle is supposed to mean. PAP as
stated above, narrows down the responsibilities just for actions. But since, as
van Inwagen points out (Fischer 2011, p. 245), we can hold individuals morally
responsible also for others items such as omissions, consequences and inten-
tions, I would like to generalize PAP. In this new formulation PAP claims that a
person ismorally responsible for S, only if the person could have avoided S. I will
take PAPas divided in twodifferent parts. Thefirst part (i ) is: “a person ismorally
responsible for S” and the second part (i i ) is: “the person could have avoided S”.
These two parts are connected by a classic material conditional: (i ) → (i i ). If
a person could have avoided S it means that is possible that S does not occur.
Moreover, if it possible that S does not occur the person could have avoided S2.
If we formalize thiswehave (i i ) ↔ ^¬S. Putting these elements togetherwehave
that if (i ) → (i i ) and (i i ) ↔ ^¬S, it will follow that (i )ı^¬S.
Consider now the example of the Frankfurt-style case in the first section. In
that case we can substitute S with killing the PrimeMinister. Frankfurt claims to
have found a case in which ¬^¬S, namely in which it is not possible that Jones
does not kill the Prime Minister, but in which (i ) is true, because we consider
Jones responsible for killing the Prime Minister. In other words Frankfurt has
shown that (i ) → ^¬S, which follows directly from PAP, is wrong.
Iwould like to take amoment to analysewhat Smeans in this case. Just above
we have taken S for ‘killing the Prime Minister’. So at the question about what
Jones is responsible for, it seems prima facie plain that the correct answerwould
be, simply, an action. If we say that S, the item for which Jones is hold respon-
sible, corresponds with the action A ‘killing the Prime Minister’, it seems that
Frankfurt is right. He actually gave us a case in which (i ) → ^¬S is false. In fact,
if we substitute A in this conditional we have that Jones is responsible for A, that
is for his killing the PrimeMinister, and that¬^¬A, since in any case, whether on
his own or for the interference of Black, he would have killed the PrimeMinister.
If it is just the action at stake thenFrankfurt is right. But arewe sure that Jones
is responsible just for his action? It seems that in the example there is another
item that plays a relevant role in Jones’ responsibility. Inmymade-up case Jones
does not just kill the Prime Minister, but he kills her with the intention to do it.
2I believe that I can claim thiswithout claiming that the personmust be responsible for her avoid-
ing S.
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Jones decides3 to perform a certain action, and he acts on the basis of this deci-
sion. With a closer look to my example we could say that S is the action A based
on the intention Υ to perform such an action. Can Frankfurt’s argument work if
S = A +4 Υ? In other words is it true that Jones is responsible for the action based
on the intention to perform that action, despite the fact that it was impossible
that his action based on the intention to perform that action does not occurs?
To find out let’s substitute S with A + Υ. I am assuming, and it seems reason-
able do it, that Jones is responsible for A + Υ, so the antecedent of (i ) → ^¬S is
true. As we already know, in order to succeed in her aim a Frankfurt’s supporter
should prove that the consequent of our conditional is false, namely that ¬^¬S.
Since I am examining the case in which S is A +Υ, it is clear that Frankfurt’s sup-
porter needs to prove that ¬^¬ (A + Υ). Frankfurt’s supporter has an easy time
in doing so because she can argue in the same way we have seen above. Since
there is no possibility that the action does not occur, because of the presence of
Black’smechanism, there is no possibility that the action based on the intention
to perform that action would not occur. Frankfurt’s supporters can claim in a
convincing way that ¬^¬ (A + Υ), and therefore that PAP is wrong.
We have seen two cases so far: one in which S is identical to A and one in
whichS is identical toA+Υ. In thefirst Jones ismorally responsible for killing the
Prime Minister, in the second Jones is morally responsible for killing the Prime
Minister based on his intention for acting in this way. In these two cases we
have seen that Frankfurt’s argument is successful. I suggest however that nowwe
should test carefully our intuitions about what Jones is responsible for. It seems
sensible to affirm that Jones is responsible for his acting in such a way with the
intention todo it (our secondcase). I suggest now todivide the two itemsat stake
in this case: the action A and the intention Υ. It could be, in fact, that it is just
one of these two items that plays a relevant role in holding Jones responsible. I
suggest the following device in order to identify the item we are looking for: the
item essential for Jones’ responsibility (Mele 2008, p. 277). In this situation we
have three elements: (i ) Jones’ responsibility, A Jones’ killing the PrimeMinister,
Υ Jones having the intention to kill the PrimeMinister. I have already established
that if both A andΥ occur we have (i ) as an outcome. Now I am going to see if (i )
depends just on one of these two items. If I verify that removing one of these two
items, and leaving the other as it is, there is a change in the truth value of (i ), I
can claim that (i ), Jones’ responsibility, depends on the former item; therefore I
will conclude that such an itemplays a fundamental role in Jones’ responsibility.
3Although it could be useful, at a deeper level, to distinguish between ‘have the intention to per-
form an action’ and ‘decide to perform an action’, I believe that, in regard to this paper, this distinc-
tion is not necessary.
4I will use the non-logical sign + without any precise meaning. A + I means just the action based
on the intention to perform such an action. If I have used the logical connective ∧, I would had run
into some complications, as the reader can certify.
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Take the case in which Jones, that morning, was overwhelmed by his same
old cowardice, and he abandoned his intention to kill the PrimeMinister. What
would happen in this case? Black, who can read Jones’ mind as a book thanks to
his mechanism, would interfere and make Jones kill the Prime Minister. What
should we say about Jones’ responsibility in a such a situation? It seems obvi-
ous that, if we know the circumstances, namely that in Jones’ brain there is a
mechanism that will force him in the murder if he does not show the intention
to kill the Prime Minister, nobody would hold Jones morally responsible for his
killing the Prime Minister. If we remove Jones’ intention to kill the Prime Min-
ister (i ) is false. On the other hand, according to our example, given that Jones
has the intention to kill the Prime Minister, we would hold, as Frankfurt clearly
states, Jones responsible for his killing the Prime Minister. The point seems to
be clear: if there is Jones’ intention to kill the Prime Minister then Jones is re-
sponsible (Υ → (i )); if there is no intention to kill the Prime Minister then Jones
is not responsible (¬Υ → (i )). From this follows that Υ ↔ (i ). What should we
say, in the Frankfurt-style case at issue,5 about the role of the action A in the ex-
planation of Jones’ responsibility? I have shown two cases in which (i )’s truth
value changes: the case in which there is Jones’ intention to kill the Prime Min-
ister, and we have that (i ) is true, and the case in which Jones has no intention
to kill the Prime Minister, and we have that (i ) is false. In both cases A occurs. It
seems evident therefore, that the action does not play an essential role in Jones’
responsibility, while the intention does, since, as I have shown, Υ↔ (i ).
I believe I have just proved that S, the item for which Jones’ is morally re-
sponsible, corresponds with Υ, namely Jones’ intention to kill the Prime Minis-
ter. Therefore PAP, in my case, takes this shape: (i ) → ^¬Υ. To reiterate, in order
to prove the validity of Frankfurt’s criticism to PAP, it must be proved that the
consequent is false. Hence, in this last case, Frankfurt’s supporter should prove
that ¬^¬Υ. But this, as we have just seen, is not the case. About Υ there are al-
ternative possibilities: both ^¬Υ and ^Υ are true. Jones has the possibility to
have the intention to kill the PrimeMinister and the possibility not to have such
an intention. The interference system prevents Jones only from the possibility
of ¬A, because in any case Jones will act A, namely ¬^¬A. Frankfurt’s supporter
is not able to show that (i ) → ^¬Υ is false. I have proved that, as regarding the
item that truly plays a role in my case, there are alternative possibilities. These
alternative possibilities are relevant for responsibility because, if my argument
works, they concern the essential item that explains responsibility itself.
5Which I take as model for the most common Frankfurt-style cases.
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3 A criticism tomy argument and another proposal
Themain argument of this paper has been already presented in the second sec-
tion. In this section Iwould like to show apossible criticism tomy argument and
to address to it, and finally, I will sketch a new argument against Frankfurt-style
cases that should prove what I have already shown in the second section.
A Frankfurt supporter can raise an objection to my argument. She can build
a different example in which Black’s interference can happen in a different mo-
ment. In my previous example Black pushes the button after Jones shows an
intention about his action. If he shows an intention to kill the Prime Minister
Black will not interfere; on the other hand if he shows an intention to not kill the
Prime Minister Black will interfere. The moment in which Black can interfere,
removing alternative possibilities, is after the intention. Frankfurt’s supporter
could make up a case in which Black can interfere before the intention. This
move should allow Frankfurt’s supporter to remove the alternative possibility
that I discovered in section 2. Let’smake explicit the example I am talking about.
Jones is the same person I described above, and he shows up in front of the par-
liament with a gun. The night before Black had installed a special mechanism
in Jones’ brain. Thismechanism is able to show if Jones is forming the intention
to kill the PrimeMinister or not, and, in the case that Jones is forming the inten-
tionnot to kill the PrimeMinister, Black canpush abutton that triggers a process
in Jones’ brain, that ends with Jones’ intention to kill the Prime Minister. That
morning in front of the parliament Jones forms on his own the intention to kill
the Prime Minister and he acts according to his intention. In this case it seems
that we hold Jones responsible for his killing the Prime Minister, and there was
not an alternative possibility about his intention to do it. Black’s mechanism
prevents Jones from the intention not to kill the PrimeMinister. If we come back
to the logical formalization I proposed in section 2, it means that, given that S
is Υ, (i ) is true and ¬^¬Υ. In this case (i ) → ^¬Υ is false, therefore Frankfurt is
right about PAP.
I think that this criticism tomyargument canbe rejected (seeWiderker (1995,
pp. 249-251)). I suggest thinking aboutwhat ‘forming an intention’ reallymeans,
since forming an intention plays an important role in the last example. I believe
that ‘Jones is forming an intention’ can have two differentmeanings relevant for
my inquiry. Jones is forming an intention Υ can mean either 1) Jones will have
the intention Υ6 or 2) Jones will likely have the intention Υ but he can change
his mind. It seems to me that these two cases are jointly exhaustive. Take the
case 1). It seems that in this case there is no difference with the case I have anal-
ysed in section 2. If forming the intention will necessarily bring about the in-
6It this case there is a necessary relation between forming an intention and having such an inten-
tion.
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tention, Frankfurt’s supporter has just pushed the debate one step back without
any change regarding the outcome. In fact I can just move the responsibility
from the intention to the forming the intention,7 and I can show that in this last
example there are indeed alternative possibilities about forming the intention.
Let’s move on to 2). In this case it seems obvious, by definition, that Jones has
alternative possibilities: he can form his intention to kill the PrimeMinister, but
still he could change his mind and give up that intention. If what I have just
said is coherent I see no reason why my argument against Frankfurt-style cases
should be undermined by this last more sophisticated example.
I would like now to mention another possible way to attack Frankfurt-style
cases. I will not go into detail with this part, because I believe I have already
proved what was of concern, namely the fact that in Frankfurt-style cases there
are alternative possibilities about the item relevant for the moral responsibility.
PAP states that an agent is morally responsible for what she has done only if
the agent could have done otherwise. I believe that Frankfurt-style cases do not
prove that PAP iswrong since they change themeaningof the term ‘agent’ in PAP.
More precisely I think that when Frankfurt’s supporter claims that “an agent is
morally responsible for what she has done, even if she could not have done oth-
erwise”, ‘agent’ and ‘she’ donothave the samemeaning since ‘she’ is not anagent
at all. Frankfurt’s supporter needs to prove that the individual that is morally
responsible for something is the same individual that could not have done oth-
erwise. I believe that as regarding (i ), namely holding responsible Jones, we are
holding responsible an agent, in the genuine sense of agent. Butwhat shouldwe
say about (i i )? By saying that Jones does not have alternative possibilities, arewe
talking about an agent in the genuine sense of agent? If the answer is negative, as
I would like to suggest, it seems that Frankfurt’s supporter, in her attack to PAP, is
playing with words since the subject of (i ) is not the same subject as in (i i ). Say-
ing that Jones has not alternative possibilities, in other words that he could not
do otherwise, means, in the case at stake, that Jones cannot not kill the Prime
Minister. Jones cannot not kill the Prime Minister because Black’s mechanism,
by brainwashing Jones’ mind, would force him to kill the Prime Minister if he
shows the intention not to kill the Prime Minister. If we say that Jones has no
alternative possibilities, we are saying that in the possible world in which Jones
does not show the intention to kill the PrimeMinister, Blackwould push the but-
ton, causing Jones’ to kill the PrimeMinister. I believe that in this possible world
Jones, since he would be brainwashed, would lack his property to be an agent
because he would lack any kind of control that we expect from an agent.
7If we assume that not only forming an intentionΥnecessarily implies having an intentionΥ, but
also that, as it should be plain, having an intention Υ necessarily implies that one had forming an
intention Υ; there is, as a matter of fact, no difference between forming an intention Υ and having
an intention Υ.
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If the reader shows some resistances regarding what I have just argued, I
think that this it is due to the particular story of the example. In my example
Jones, that morning, goes out with a gun in his coat and with hate for the Prime
Minister in his heart. If he will not shoot, it is just because of his cowardice.
Moreover we know that his deciding to kill the Prime Minister is up to him, and
it is a matter of subtle feelings and thoughts in his mind. Maybe we could be in-
clined to see the interferencemechanism as a little push in a certain direction. I
would like to change the story in order to give force to my argument.
That morning, in front of the parliament, there will be a parade in which the
PrimeMinister will walk among the people and she will shake some hands. Also
in this example Black hates the PrimeMinister, but not so much as in the previ-
ous one. Black decides to put (on the sly) amechanism in the brain of a random
citizen, who will participate at the parade. This mechanism shows to Black if
the citizen will have the intention the punch the PrimeMinister in the face, and
it will enable Black, if the citizen does not show such an intention, to press a
button that will cause the citizen to punch the Prime Minister. We do not know
anything about this citizen, but as it normally happens, we would not think that
she is going to punch the Prime Minister. As expected, the unlucky citizen does
not show the intention to punch the Prime Minister, therefore Black interferes.
Wouldwe say that the citizen, in this case, preserves her property to be an agent?
I donot think so. She is totally forced to do something nobodywould ever expect
from her. If I am right Frankfurt’s supporter is not able to prove that the agent,
properly speaking, has no alternative possibilities. The subject of (i i ) for whom
there are no alternative possibilities, is not an agent as the subject of (i ) that we
hold responsible. If I am right Frankfurt’s supporter has not proved that PAP is
false.
4 Conclusion
I thinkmore shouldbe said about this last criticismagainst Frankfurt-style cases.
First of all the notion of agent could be discussed in details. However I believe
that I have already carried out the task of this paper. In conclusion I would like
to note that even if Frankfurt-style cases do not represent a valid argument for
compatibilism, there can be still some good reasons for compatibilism. For ex-
ample one could conceive liberty in the Kantian negative sense, namely as the
freedomfromspecificboundsand interferences. The reader caneasilynote that,
according to such conception, liberty can survive the loss of PAP.
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